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Abstract
Medication errors in critical care are frequent, serious, and predic-
table. Critically ill patients are prescribed twice as many medica-
tions as patients outside of the intensive care unit (ICU) and nearly
all will suffer a potentially life-threatening error at some point during
their stay. The aim of this article is to provide a basic review of
medication errors in the ICU, identify risk factors for medication
errors, and suggest strategies to prevent errors and manage their
consequences.
Introduction
Health care delivery is not infallible. Errors are common in
most health care systems and are reported to be the seventh
most common cause of death overall [1]. The 1999 Institute
of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health System, drew public attention to the importance of
patient safety [2]. This was followed with considerable
interest by the medical community [3]. However, to date,
there is little evidence that patient safety has improved [4]. In
the intensive care unit (ICU), on average, patients experience
1.7 errors per day [5] and nearly all suffer a potentially life-
threatening error at some point during their stay [6].
Medication errors account for 78% of serious medical errors
in the ICU [7]. The aim of this article is to provide a basic
review of medication errors in the ICU as well as strategies to
prevent errors and manage their consequences.
What is a medication error?
Providing a single hospitalized patient with a single dose of a
single medication requires correctly executing 80 to 200
individual steps [8]. This hospital medication use process can
be categorized into five broad stages: prescription, trans-
cription, preparation, dispensation, and administration [9]. An
error can occur at any point in this process. A medication
error is any error in the medication process, whether there are
adverse consequences or not (Table 1) [10]. Most errors
occur during the administration stage (median of 53% of all
errors), followed by prescription (17%), preparation (14%),
and transcription (11%) [11]. The earlier in the medication
process an error occurs, the more likely it is to be intercepted
[12]. Administration appears to be particularly vulnerable to
error because of a paucity of system checks as most
medications are administered by a single nurse [13]. Nurses
and pharmacists intercept up to 70% of prescription errors
[14]. Preparation errors occur when there is a difference
between the ordered amount or concentration of a medica-
tion and what is actually prepared and administered. The
industry standard for pharmaceutical preparations is a
concentration difference of less than 10% [15]. However,
approximately two thirds of infusions prepared by nurses are
outside industry-accepted standards and 6% contain a
greater than twofold concentration error [16]. Transcription
errors are usually attributed to handwriting, abbreviation use,
unit misinterpretation (‘mg’ for ‘mcg’), and mistakes in reading.
How are medication errors classified?
James Reason developed a well-recognized system for
human error classification based on observations from indus-
tries that have become highly reliable such as aviation and
nuclear power [17]. He states that errors arise for two
reasons: active failures and latent conditions.
Active failures are unsafe acts committed by people who are
in direct contact with the patient. They take a variety of forms:
slips, lapses, and mistakes (Table 1). Slips and lapses are
skill-based behavior errors, when a routine behavior is
misdirected or omitted. The person has the right idea but
performs the wrong execution. For example, forgetting to
restart an infusion of heparin postoperatively is a lapse.
Restarting the heparin infusion but entering an incorrect
infusion rate despite knowing the correct rate is a slip.
Mistakes are knowledge-based errors (perception, judgment,
inference, and interpretation) and occur due to incorrect
thought processes or analyses. For example, prescribing
heparin in a patient diagnosed with heparin-induced thrombo-
cytopenia is a mistake. Situational factors (fatigue, drugs,
alcohol, stress, and multiple activities) can divert attention
and increase the risk of active failures.
Review
Clinical review: Medication errors in critical care
Eric Moyen, Eric Camiré and Henry Thomas Stelfox
Department of Critical Care Medicine, University of Calgary, Foothills Medical Centre, EG23A, 1403-29 Street NW, Calgary, AB, Canada, T2N 2T9
Corresponding author: Henry Thomas Stelfox, tom.stelfox@calgaryhealthregion.ca
Published: 12 March 2008 Critical Care 2008, 12:208 (doi:10.1186/cc6813)
This article is online at http://ccforum.com/content/12/2/208
© 2008 BioMed Central Ltd
ADE = adverse drug event; CPOE = computerized physician order entry; ICU = intensive care unit; IOM = Institute of Medicine.Page 2 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Critical Care    Vol 12 No 2 Moyen et al.
Latent conditions are resident pathogens within the system.
They can affect the rate at which employees execute active
failures and the risks associated with active failures. Latent
failures occur when individuals make decisions that have
unintended consequences in the future [17]. Prevention
requires an ongoing tenacious search and corrective actions
once latent conditions are identified. For example, institutions
that use staffing models that depend on providers to routinely
perform clinical duties above and beyond their regular
responsibilities paradoxically risk introducing time pressures,
fatigue, and low morale into their work force.
Errors can alternatively be classified as errors of omission or
errors of commission (Table 1). Errors of omission are defined
as failure to perform an appropriate action [6]. On average,
patients receive only half of the recommended care they
should receive [18]. Errors of commission are defined as
performing an inappropriate action [6]. Most studies in the
patient safety literature focus on errors of commission such
as wrong drug or wrong dose. Problems with effectiveness
and access to drug therapy have been studied much less
frequently [19].
How common are medication errors?
The reported incidence of medication errors varies widely
between clinical settings and patient populations and
between studies. Errors appear to occur in approximately 6%
of hospital medication use episodes [11]. Among critically ill
adults, the rate of medication errors ranges from 1.2 to 947
errors per 1,000 patient ICU days with a median of 106
errors per 1,000 patient ICU days [20]. In children, 100 to
400 prescribing errors have been reported per 1,000
patients [21]. Several factors account for this large variation
in reported medication errors. First, the definition of medica-
tion error, including both the numerator and denominator
selected for rate calculations, is critical. For example,
medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) are
frequently reported as individual events, as a numerator, but
with no denominator [6]. Furthermore, selecting an appro-
priate denominator that reflects exposure to risk can be
difficult [6]. Should medication errors be reported per patient,
patient day, medication day, or dose administered? Second,
the process node (prescription, transcription, and so on)
under investigation will influence incidence estimates [20].
Third, the method of reporting medication errors influences
rate estimates [22,23]. Spontaneous reporting of medication
errors may under-report events [11,22]. Review of the
medical records is considered by many experts the bench-
mark for estimating the extent of errors and adverse events in
hospitals but is dependent on accurate documentation [24].
Automation of medical record reviews with computers can be
used to improve efficiency and allow for prospective reviews
[22]. Direct patient monitoring may be the ultimate reference
standard but is dependent on observer expertise and is very
labor-intensive [25]. Fourth, the culture of individual ICUs, the
number of ICUs participating in error reporting, and the
technologies employed can significantly influence error
reporting. Medication error trends over time using the same
standardized measurement tools are more likely to provide
valuable information than periodic cross-sectional surveys.
What are the consequences of medication
errors?
Medication errors are an important cause of patient morbidity
and mortality [9]. Although only 10% of medication errors
result in an ADE, these errors have profound implications for
patients, families, and health care providers [13,26,27]. The
IOM report highlights that 44,000 to 98,000 patients die
each year as a result of medical errors, a large portion of
these being medication-related [2]. Approximately one fifth
(19%) of medication errors in the ICU are life-threatening and
almost half (42%) are of sufficient clinical importance to
warrant additional life-sustaining treatments [28]. However,
deaths are only the tip of the iceberg. The human and societal
burden is even greater with many patients experiencing costly
and prolonged hospital stays and some patients never fully
recovering to their premorbid status [29,30]. Bates and
colleagues [30] estimated that in American hospitals the
annual cost of serious medication errors in 1995 was $2.9
million per hospital and that a 17% decrease in incidence
would result in $480,000 savings per hospital. Finally, the
psychological impact of errors should not be ignored [30].
Errors erode patient, family, and public confidence in health
Table 1
Definitions
Medical error The failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended or the use of a wrong 
plan to achieve an aim [2].
Medication error Any error in the medication process, whether 
there are adverse consequences or not [10].
Adverse drug event Any injury related to the use of a drug [77].
Not all adverse drug events are caused by 
medical error, nor do all medication errors 
result in an adverse drug event [26].
Preventable adverse  Harm that could be avoided through 
event reasonable planning or proper execution of an 
action [6].
Near miss The occurrence of an error that did not result 
in harm [6].
Slip A failure to execute an action due to a routine 
behavior being misdirected [17].
Lapse A failure to execute an action due to lapse in 
memory and a routine behavior being omitted 
[17].
Mistake A knowledge-based error due to an incorrect 
thought process or analysis [17].
Error of omission Failure to perform an appropriate action [6].
Error of commission Performing an inappropriate action [6].Page 3 of 7
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care organizations [31]. Memories of error can haunt
providers for many years [32].
What is unique about the ICU and medication
errors?
The ICU brings together high-risk patients and interventions
in a complex environment (Table 2) [33]. The single strongest
predictor of an ADE is patient illness severity [34]. Critically ill
patients are prescribed twice as many medications as
patients outside of the ICU [35]. Most medications in the ICU
are administered as weight-based infusions. These infusions
require mathematical calculations and frequently are based
on estimated weights increasing the risk of error [20,28].
Multicentered studies by Ridley and colleagues [36] and
Calabrese and colleagues [13] identified potassium chloride,
heparin, magnesium sulphate, vasoactive drugs, sedatives,
and analgesics as the medications with the greatest risk of
error. Antibiotics frequently are empirically prescribed in the
ICU and errors have potential implications both for individual
patients and populations [37,38]. Patients are prescribed
these medications in an environment that is stressful, complex,
changing, under the stewardship of multiple providers, and
frequently managing patients in crisis [20]. It is important to
remember that critically ill patients have fewer defenses
against adverse events than other patients do. They have
limited ability to participate in their medical care and they lack
the physiological reserve to tolerate additional injury.
Moreover, they are reliant on sophisticated technologies and
equipment to deliver essential care and yet relatively little is
known about medical equipment failures and the associated
safety risks. Finally, lack of continuity of care at discharge
from the ICU is a well-known feature putting the patient at risk
for errors and highlights the importance of communication
with the future caregivers [39].
How can we prevent medication errors?
Improved medication safety can be accomplished by
optimizing the safety of the medication process, eliminating
situational risk factors, and providing strategies to both
intercept errors and mitigate their consequences. Several
interventions have been shown to decrease medical error in
the ICU (Table 3).
The safest and most efficient means of improving patient
safety is to improve the safety of the medication process.
Strategies that have been shown to be successful include
medication standardization [40,41], computerized physician
order entry (CPOE) [42,43], bar code technology [44,45],
computerized intravenous infusion devices [9], and medica-
tion reconciliation [46]. CPOE targets the prescription and
transcription stages of the medication process. The
technology permits clinicians to enter orders directly into a
computer workstation that is linked to a hospital clinical infor-
mation system [47]. The main advantages of these systems
are that they can track allergies, recommend drug dosages,
provide adjustments for patients with altered renal or hepatic
function, and identify potential drug-drug interactions [11].
Major limitations for implementation include capital costs,
provider willingness to adopt the technology, and worries
about technical malfunctions and paradoxical increases in
medication errors during implementation periods [9,48]. Two
systematic reviews have documented that CPOE systems
increase clinician adherence to guidelines and alerts, improve
organizational efficiency, reduce costs, and even prevent
medication errors, but there is limited evidence to support
improved patient safety [42,43]. In this regard, CPOE
technology highlights the important distinction between error
and harm; errors are an important intermediate outcome, but
preventing patient harm is the ultimate goal [49]. CPOE
technology currently is not used in the majority of ICUs [50].
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Table 2
Risk factors for medication errors in the intensive care unit
Factors Specific risk factors
Patient Severity of illness
Strongest predictor of ADE [25,34]
ICU patients more likely to experience ADE 
than patients in other units [35]
Extreme of ages
Increased susceptibility to ADEs [2,78]
Prolonged hospitalization
Increased exposure and susceptibility to ADEs 
[2,78]
Sedation
Patients unable to participate in care and 
defend themselves against errors [9]
Medications Types of medications
Frequent use of boluses and infusions [9]
Weight-based infusions derived from estimated 
weights or unreliable determinations [79]
Mathematical calculations required for 
medication dosages [9]
Programming of infusion pumps [44]
Number of medications
Twice as many medications prescribed as for 
patients in other units [35]
Increased probability of medication error and 
medication interactions [35]
Number of interventions
Increased risk of complications [80]
ICU Complex  environment
environment Difficult working conditions make errors more 
probable [81]
High stress [20]
High turnover of patients and providers [82,83]
Emergency admissions
Risk of an adverse event increases by 
approximately 6% per day [25,84]
Multiple care providers
Challenges the integration of different care 
plans [83]
ADE, adverse drug event; ICU, intensive care unit.Bar code technologies target the administration phase of the
medication process. Used in conjunction with CPOE, bar
code labels for the medication, the patient, and the provider
administering the medication are scanned, reconciled, and
documented electronically. This process helps ensure that
the correct patient gets the correct dose of the correct drug
by the correct route at the correct time [44]. Administration
errors have been documented to be reduced by 60% [45].
Computerized intravenous infusion devices allow incorpora-
tion of CPOE and bar code technology for intravenous
medications such that standardized concentrations, infusion
rates, and dosing limits can be provided to help prevent
intravenous medication errors [9].
Three quarters of patient medications are stopped on patient
admission to the ICU [39,51]. Many of these medications are
not restarted by the time of patient discharge from the ICU
(88%) or hospital (30%) [39,51]. Medication reconciliation is
a process that matches a patient’s current hospital medica-
tion regimen against a patient’s long-term medication
regimen. A coordinated medication reconciliation program
can prevent drug withdrawal and ensure that life-saving
medications are continued or restarted as soon as appro-
priate [46].
Situational risk factors can divert providers’ attention and
increase the risk of active failures. These need to be
minimized. For example, acute and chronic sleep deprivation
among residents has been shown to increase the risk of error
[52,53]. Therefore, it seems reasonable to establish clinical
routines that balance the risk of provider fatigue against the
risk of frequent patient sign-over [54]. Trainee supervision
and graduated responsibility represent additional risk factors
that need to be managed. Clinical inexperience can have a
major impact on errors. First-year residents are five times
more likely to make prescribing errors than those with more
experience [55], as are residents at the start of new rotations
[56]. Pharmacological knowledge is an independent
predictor of medication errors by health care providers [11]. It
is important to capture providers when they start in new
environments, train them, and then provide graduated
supervision as they develop experience [57]. Although efforts
should be directed at targeting situational risk factors, it is
important to note that most medication errors occur when
individuals are working under what they perceive to be
reasonably normal conditions and denying fatigue, stress, or
distractions at the time of the error [35].
Physicians, nurses, and pharmacists are integral to medica-
tion oversight and error interception. Participation of an
intensivist in patient care in the ICU has been reported to
decrease medication errors from 22% to 70% [58],
complications by 50% [59], ICU mortality, ICU length of stay,
and hospital length of stay and to improve patient safety [60].
Pharmacists, similarly, have an important role to play in
medication safety. First, all intravenous medications should be
prepared within the pharmacy department by pharmacists
using a standardized process and standardized medication
concentrations. Second, participation of a pharmacist in
clinical rounds improves patient safety by reducing
preventable ADEs by 66% [61] while shortening patients’
length of hospital stay [62,63], decreasing mortality [64], and
decreasing medication expenditures [65,66].
Nurses play a particularly important role in patient safety
because they are the health care providers with whom
patients are likely to spend the greatest amount of time. This
has two important implications. One, decreasing nurse-to-
patient staffing ratios may be associated with an increased
risk of medical errors [67,68]. Nurse-to-patient ratios of 1:1
or 1:2 appear to be safest in the ICU [69]. Second, nursing
experience may have an important influence on patient safety.
Experienced nurses are more likely to intercept errors
compared with less experienced nurses [70].
What can we learn from errors?
Incompetent or irresponsible clinicians do not cause most
adverse events. James Reason provides a compelling
explanation of error using Swiss cheese as a model
(Figure 1). In the real world, our defenses against adverse
events, like slices of Swiss cheese, are imperfect. These
holes continually open, close, and shift their locations. An
adverse event occurs when the holes in many layers of
defense momentarily line up [71]. Therefore, it is not
surprising that models of quality improvement based on
identifying and removing ‘bad apple’ clinicians have not been
effective in improving the safety of health care [72].
Critical Care    Vol 12 No 2 Moyen et al.
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Table 3
Sample strategies to prevent medication errors
Optimize the medication process
1. Medication standardization
2. Computerized physician order entry and clinical decision support
3. Bar code technology
4. Computerized intravenous infusion devices
5. Medication reconciliation
Eliminate situational risk factors
1. Avoid excessive consecutive and cumulative working hours
2. Minimize interruptions and distractions
3. Trainee supervision and graduated responsibility
Oversight and error interception
1. Intensivist participation in ICU care
2. Adequate staffing
3. Pharmacist participation in ICU care
4. Incorporation of quality assurance into academic education 
ICU, intensive care unit.Conversely, high-reliability organizations such as aircraft
carriers, nuclear power plants, and air traffic controllers have
markedly improved safety by standardizing practices and
investing in safety training and research [71,73]. Three simple
strategies to change medicine’s approach to medication
errors have been proposed [74]: (a) recognize that current
approaches for preventing medication errors are inadequate;
(b) improve the error-reporting system, avoid punishment, and
focus on identifying performance improvement opportunities;
and (c) understand and enhance human performance within
the medication use process.
We should focus on developing systems that view humans as
fallible and assume that errors will occur, even in the best
organizations. In this model, multiple barriers and safeguards
can be developed to reduce the frequency of ADEs. Error
reporting is an important component of this strategy because
it reveals the active failures and latent conditions in the
system [6]. Near misses are incidents that did not lead to
harm but could have resulted in patient injury. Reporting
these as well as adverse events offers several advantages
over reporting only adverse events. These include greater
event frequency for quantitative analysis, fewer reporting
barriers partly owing to fewer liability concerns, and an
opportunity to study recovery patterns [75]. Ideally, error
reporting should be voluntary, anonymous, centralized to
increase the pool of data, and designed to identify
opportunities for performance improvement. However, error
reporting alone will not improve patient safety but rather is the
first step in a continuous quality improvement cycle [6]. In
addition, error reporting has its limitations. Like any
intervention, it can have unintended consequences such as
creating incentives for gaming the health care system,
particularly if penalties or rewards are directly or indirectly
associated with reporting [76]. In addition, error reporting can
be labor-intensive. For example, a 10-bed ICU could be
anticipated to produce more than 6,200 error reports per
year (1.7 errors per patient per day × 10 beds × 365 days).
Reporting near misses would substantially increase the
number of reports. Some systems such as the AIMS-ICU
(Australian Incident Monitoring Study in Intensive Care) and
the ICUSRS (Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting System)
have been developed with the goal of balancing the strengths
and limitations of error reporting [72].
Conclusion
Patient safety is an important health care issue because of
the consequences of iatrogenic injuries. Medication errors in
critical care are frequent, serious, and predictable. Human
factor research in nonmedical settings suggests that deman-
ding greater vigilance from providers of medical care may not
result in meaningful safety improvement. Instead, the
approach of identifying failures and redesigning faulty
systems appears to be a more promising way to reduce
human error.
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